We study the role of pricing policies in multiple service class networks.
Introduction
Recent research on computer networks has been concerned almost exclusively with the hardware, software, and protocol standards needed to achieve better network performance. This research program has been an outstanding success. Today's computer networks link thousands of institutions and have become an indispensable part of the academic and industrial communication infrastructure. These networks support a wide variety of applications, including terminal connections, file transfers, X-server connections, voice, and video. Furthermore, significantly faster and more sophisticated networks are currently being designed and prototype; it is expected that these networks will spark a whole new generation of applications. However, such technical progress is not the only important issue affecting network performance.
Just as the performance of the network cannot be derived solely from protocol specifications (as pointed out by Clark [1]), it is also true that from the perspective of end users (applications), network performance cannot be derived solely from implementation specifics.
Network performance is also a function of the offered load, and the offered load is a function of the incentives individual users encounter when using the network. Thus, the issue of user incentives must be considered. Note
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To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission. @1991 ACM O-8979J.444.9/9J/0008/OJ 23...$1.50 that these incentives can take many forms: performance incentives, monetary incentives, administrative incentives, or social incentives, to name a few. This paper represents one small effort to grapple with user incentives in multiple service claae networks. We restrict our focus to one particular aspect of network incentives; the intertwining of pricing policies, which produce monetaryl incentives, and multiclass service disciplines, which produce performance incentives.
Our treatment is by no means comprehensive,
and much of what we contend is not controversial.
We view this work as an initial attempt to illustrate, through simulation, some of the issues involved in the interplay bet ween pricing policies and multiclass service disciplines.
We consider a very simple multiclass service discipline and compare two different pricing policies:
(1) flat per-byte fees and (2) graduated fees for different priority classes. Measuring user satisfaction as a function of both the cost and quality of service received, and studying a simple network configuration with several different applications using standard transport-layer protocols, our study shows that every simulated user is more satisfied with the graduated pricing scheme.
In Section 2 we provide additional motivation for our study of multiple service class networks. Section 3 describes the multiclass service discipline and pricing schemes under consideration.
The model presented in Section 4 characterizes, for each of four example applications, user satisfaction as a function of the service delivered by the network. We present our simulation results in Section 5, and discuss their significance in the context of related work in Section 6. The simulated network's priority-service discipline (described in Section 3.1) represents a toy model of the sophisticated TOS mechanisms we exDect to find in future . .
networks.
We then compare two different pricing schemes. One pricing scheme is a flat per-byte usage fee. In this case, we assume users have no incentive to select less than optimal service classes, and so the service mechanism reverts back to a single class of service discipline.
The other pricing scheme is a graduated set of prices with the lower quality TOS'S being cheaper.
Here, there are incentives for requesting less than optimal service. We find, for the network configurations studied here, that it is possible to set the prices so that everv user is more satisfied with the combined cost and . performance of this network with graduated prices. Thus, in answer to the key question posed above, it was possible to set prices in our simulation in such a way that (1) for some users the performance penalty they received for requesting a less-than-optimal service class wss offset by the reduced price of the service, and (2) for the other users the monetary penalty incurred by using the more expensive higher quality service classes was offset by the improved performance they receive.
Thus, prices allowed us to spread the benefits of multiple service classes around to all users, rather than having these benefits remain exclusively with users who were performance-sensitive.
Network Model
In this section we present our network model, describing in turn the service discipline, pricing schemes, and network topology.
Our goal is to provide a simple example that illustrates our point. Thus, our emphasis is not on detailed and complicated models, but on extreme simplicity.
Multiclass Service Discipline
At an abstract level, there are only two decisions faced by a gateway. When the line is free and there are packets in the queue, the gateway must select the next packet to transmit. When a packet arrives and there is no room in the queue, the gateway must decide which packet to discard. The simplest multiclass service discipline is to have, for each of these decisions, two priority levels. Thus, on each packet there is a priority service flag and a priority no-drop flag. There are then four service classes, corresponding to the four possible combinations of flag settings. In Section 4 we will discuss how to set these priorities, but for now we just discuss their role in determining the gateway's handling of the packets. The gateway gives preference in service to those packets with the priority flags on. Within a priority class, service is provided in a FIFO order. Thus, when the line is idle, the earliest arrived packet that has the service priority flag on is serviced.
If there are no such packets, then the earliest arrived packet without the service priority flag is serviced. We discard packets in the following order: both priority flags off, service priority flag on and no-drop flag off, service priority flag off and no-drop flag on, and finally both priority In order to facilitate direct comparwon between the two pricing schemes in the simulation study presented below, we require that both pricing schemes recover the same net revenue, which we refer to as D. Thus, the absolute values of the prices in the two schemes will depend on the offered load. This means choosing p~t.t and Pprioritv so that the total revenue is equal to D.
Network Configuration
We study the interaction between the service discipline and the pricing scheme on a very simple network topology. This net work, as shown in Figure  1 , consists of two hosts connected to two gateways through two 10 Mbps Ethernets, respectively; the two gateways in turn are connected by a single bottleneck link.
We assume that there are a number of users on host-1 running a variety of applications which require the transfer of data to host-2.
In the next section we discuss our user model.
4
User Model
In this section we describe how we model users in our simple network. Each user is represented by a network application which sends data from host-1 to host-2 in Figure 1 . Users care about the cost of running an application, which we will denote by C. Users also care about the performance of their application; this application performance is a function of the network performance. We have so far given a general description of the problem we are addressing and the various issues involved. We now turn to describing the details of our simulation.
Simulation Configuration
The applications are built upon two transport protocols. Email, FTP, and Telnet use TCP [8] whereas Voice uses UDP [7] .
UDP was chosen for Voice because, given the strict delay constraints of that application, ret ransmissions of dropped packets are not useful.
As mentioned in Section 4.1 the user repeatedly requests service from their application, and the application's performance is averaged over all such instances.
Each request can be characterized by a size, s, and the time interval, t, from the last invocation of the application. We have modeled this user behavior by a random process, with both the request size and the time interval being exponentially distributed random variables with means F and 7 respectively.
For Email and FTP, the size of a request refers to the size of the message or file to be transmitted.
These messages and files are transmitted using a maximum packet size of 500 bytes.
For Telnet, the size of a request is the number of characters generated in a burst; each character is transmitted and echoed separately, using 50 byte packetsg. A voice request is a conversation; the size of the request is the duration of the conversation. We tested the benefits of priority pricing in two dMerent configurations.
In the first configuration, there were 2 voice applications, 4 FTP applications, 5 Email applications, and 2 Telnet client applications.
In the second configuration, there were 2 voice applications, 3 FTP applications, 5
Email applications, and 4 Telnet applications.
The values for the means of the request size and interval distributions F and ? are in Tables 1 and 2 In both instances, the bottleneck link was 80~0 utilized averaged over the 90 minute time period.
Results
For each configuration, we compared the flat pricing scheme with the priority pricing scheme. The values for C, V, and U for each run are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Recall that it is inappropriate to compare V and U values between different applications; they are intended solely to compare the satisfaction of a given simulated application under the two situations.
For instance, the fact that the V values are different for the various FTP users is because they have different traffic generation parameters E and 7, not because one user is more satisfied than the other in some absolute sense. The main result apparent in these data is that every simulated user has a higher level of satisfaction with the priority pricing scheme.
When a flat price is set, all simulated applications use the highest quality service class available (i.e., both priority flags on), and the network performance is quite poor. Only about 82~o of the voice packets are delivered on time in configuration 1, and only 65~0 in configuration 2. The Telnet delays ranged from 250ms to lsec in both configurations. Note that this is not because there is no multiclass service mechanism available; rather, it is because in the absence of user incentives, we assume that every user requested high quality service. In contrast, under priority pricing, users are motivated to choose the appropriate service class, and the multiclass service discipline enabled the more performance sensitive applications to achieve better performance. User responses to incentives has also been treated in the game theory literature.
While only simple queueing network models are considered (see [9] and references therein), the incentive issues addressed are quite similar to those discussed in this paper.
In this first modeling effort we have only addressed the issue of TOS requests.
We did not consider a broader set of user actions such as demand elasticity, in which users reduce offered load in resDonse to increased mice. and substitution.
. We have demonstrated in a simulation that it is possible to set the prices so that every user is more satisfied with the combined cost and performance of a network with graduated prices and a multiclass service discipline.
On one level our conclusions are hardly surprising. Offering multiple service classes and charging differently for them is an obvious idea. However, it is a crucial idea that needs to be more fully explored.
We expect that with a fiat per-byte charge, user behavior will render the network equivalent to a single TOS network. We then think one of two outcomes is likely.
One possibility is that the quality of service will not be high enough to support demanding applications like real-time video or voice, and the only viable applications will be like those on t oday 's Internet. The other likely outcome is that, by over-engineering the network, the quality of service will be quite high, but so will the prices, and only the most quality conscious users will consider the cost worthwhile.
In 
